As sophocles observes in antigone Essay

4. Awareness (Greenleaf, 2002): Able servant-leaders are usually sharply awake and reasonably disturbed from integrated holistic perspectives, yet with inner serenity (Greenleaf, 2002). Habit 1 (of 7 or of 8), Being Proactive or the concept of Inside-Out, that any significant type of change in the would-be-leader must first come from within himself (Covey, 1900). 5. Persuasion (Greenleaf, 2002): Servant-leaders rely primarily on persuasion and on convincing even by way of group-building consensus, rather than through coercion or force based on the traditional authoritarian model (Greenleaf, 2002). While Gardner insists that: â€Å"Leadership is the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers† (Gardner, 1990). Yukl emphatically stressed, in that: â€Å"influence is the essence of leadership† (Yukl, 2001). 6. Conceptualization (Greenleaf, 2002): Servant-leaders perform a delicate balance between thinking out a problem and facing beyond day-to-day-focused-realities approach (Greenleaf, 2002). Habit 2 (of 7 or of 8), Beginning with the End in Mind, that the would-be-leader develops his own principled-center mission statement in life with long-term goals (Covey, 1900). 7. Foresight (Greenleaf, 2002): Intuitive servant-leaders understand the lessons from the past, the realities of the present, and the likely consequence of a decision for the future (Greenleaf, 2002). Characteristic 1, They Are Continually Learning, that the would-be-leader’s perception is more than enough honed by his self-initiated desire to know it all (Covey, 1992) and similar to Characteristic 6, They See Life As An Adventure (Covey, 1992). Alfred North Whitehead strongly suggested, in that: â€Å"Every leader, to be effective, must simultaneously adhere to the symbols of change and revision and the symbols of tradition and stability† (Warren Bennis, 1995). 8. Stewardship (Greenleaf, 2002): Servant-leaders merely act as stewards or â€Å"hold men and resources in trust† for the good of all or for society, emphasizing openness and persuasion (Greenleaf, 2002), likewise very similar to Stewardship Delegation (Covey, 1900). Habit 3 (of 7 or of 8), Put First Things First, that the would-be-leader’s effectiveness lies in making sure he balances his Production (P) with his building Production Capacity PC (Covey, 1900). Also, hence, according to Covey’s classification, Stewardship is under Habit 3 (Covey, 1900). 9. Commitment to the Growth of People (Greenleaf, 2002): Servant-leaders are seriously responsible and deeply committed to the growth and nurturing of each individual worker within the institution (Greenleaf, 2002). Characteristic 2, They Are Service-Oriented, that the would-be-leader/ servant-leader regards his work as a vocation or a way of life and not as a career (Covey, 1992). Characteristic 4, They Believe In Other People, that the would-be-leader is very hopeful for the beneficial potential capacity of everyone around him (Covey, 1992) though not quite far is Habit 8, It is about Finding Your Voice and Helping Others to Find Theirs (Covey, 2006). 10. Building Community (Greenleaf, 2002): Servant-leaders selflessly give themselves for building true communities among themselves who work within given institutions (Greenleaf, 2002). Characteristic 3, They Radiate Positive Energy, that the would-be-leader despite the â€Å"drudgery† of strengthening his institution, you could still find him cheerful, pleasant, happy; his attitude optimistic, positive, upbeat; and his spirit enthusiastic, hopeful, believing. Therefore, with the above, Covey concluded, in that: â€Å"A (good) habit can be defined as the intersection of knowledge, skill and desire† (Covey, 1900). Thus, with all of the above information, Sergeant Kidd’s dictum of soldiers learning to be good leaders from good leaders (Army, 1999) could now apply even to civilian employees or even ordinary civilians as more and more people are convinced through more and more pieces of literature pointing towards that thinning gray area between military and civilian leaderships. Political leadership is what John W. Gardner in his On Leadership, espoused in that: â€Å"Men and women of the greatest integrity, character, and courage should turn to public life as a natural duty and a natural outlet for their talents† (Gardner, 1990). While under business leadership falls all the works of Covey, Bennis, Goldsmith, and Yukl; however, noteworthy are those other works by Frances Hesselbein and Retired US Army General Eric Shinseki’s BE*KNOW*DO, Leadership the Army Way (Frances Hesselbein, 2004) and Jason Santamaria, Vincent Martino, and Eric Clemons’ The Marine Corps Way: Using Maneuver Warfare to Lead a Winning Organization (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003) because they believe that the business world could benefit from their shared experiences of the military. While the civilian sector regularly and easily pirates top executives from one private company to another or among themselves, the military sector cannot do that but because the military must so promote within its own ranks is why military leadership development is that paramount according to Hesselbein and Shinseki (Frances Hesselbein, 2004). Santamaria, Martino, and Climons first laid down the premise that although business and war are entirely worlds apart, the same principles apply to them because they both thrive in very competitive environments. The authors gave 23 true-to-life civilian examples followed by explanations before proceeding to compare and contrast 23 parallel true-to-life military examples (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). Like the non-original â€Å"Servant-Leader† Greenleaf with his 6th century BCE Tao Te Ching, the non-original â€Å"Maneuver Warfare† Santamaria has his more than 2,500 years ago genius and timelessness of Sun Tzu’s work The Art of War, especially in targeting critical vulnerabilities, surprise, focus, tempo (speed), and combined arms. The authors ask if they are really â€Å"natural or universal laws of warfare†; however, because the concepts are intuitive to the greatest strategists, generals, and CEOs, the authors have endeavored to transform such intuition into a systematic problem-solving approach that â€Å"the rest of us† can clearly grasp and then apply (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). These authors interchangeably explained the 46 examples in detail the workings of the Marine Corps Way by compressing Maneuver Warfare through these not only 7, but 10 Guiding Principles which when implemented singly and shortly is very powerful, but all the more deadly when applied in subsets or as an integrated whole (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). When these situationers are examined closely, potential businesses should achieve breakthrough results (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 1. Targeting Critical Vulnerabilities (Jason A.Santamaria, 2003): To attack and to swiftly take advantage of the competitor’s weaknesses after thoroughly studying both the allied leader’s group and the competitor’s situation (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 2. Boldness (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): When occasion arises to grab that opportunity to carry out calculated risks which can secure breakthrough results (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 3. Surprise (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Using surreptitiousness, vagueness, and sham to confuse the competitors. And for them to outrightly disregard their knowledge of the allied leader’s group condition thereby prejudicing their capability to position well their assets against the allied leader’s group (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 4. Focus (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Clustering together the allied leader’s group materiel at decisive places and times to take advantage of important favorable conditions to meet the allied leader’s group needs and objectives (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 5. Decentralized Decision Making (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Designating responsible people for them to make their own judicious decisions nearest the action centers after they have timely and thoroughly assessed firsthand local information about the situation within the mission target area (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 6. Tempo (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Recognizing prospective breaks, deciding, and executing plans more swiftly than opponents for the allied leader’s group to grab the upper hand and relegate the enemy to always be on the defensive and always to be confused by the allied leader’s group concerted and coordinated actions against the enemy (Jason A.Santamaria, 2003). 7. Combined Arms (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Timing the allied leader’s group attack in such a way that his group’s people, vehicles, equipment with pre-planned sequencing become orchestrated as only one entity; whereas, if the allied leader’s group use them singly, the effect will not be as dramatic (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 8. Integration of Principles (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): When measured individually, these concepts give the best results when implemented in subsets or all are treated collectively as only one whole (Jason A.Santamaria, 2003). 9. Reconnaissance Pull (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Reconnaissance pull is an illustration of implementing the concepts in subsets: the unintended reaction is an actual time happening to a golden chance to weaken or defeat the enemy, whereby when the possibility is afforded to the allied leader to surprise the enemy, that leader then familiarizes the greater organization towards the situation, with him assuming that leadership function in setting up and applying the attack. Reconnaissance pull covers four of maneuver warfare’s ten concepts: decentralized decision-making, targeting critical vulnerabilities, tempo, and focus (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003). 10. Full Integration (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003): Joining simultaneously all ten concepts together as one combined entity allows the person to effect the greatest outcome with much reduced cost of materiel (Jason A. Santamaria, 2003).